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Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games
by
ALEKSANDER BERENTSEN AND YVAN LENGWILER∗
From a game-theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to embellish the ﬁ-
nancial status of a ﬁrm and the use of drugs to enhance performance in sports are
very similar. We study the replicator dynamics of such games. We allow for het-
erogeneous populations, such as highly talented versusmore mediocre athletes, or
high-quality managers versus less able colleagues. For some parameters we ﬁnd
cyclical dynamics, so we may see waves of doping and clean sport, and cycles of
fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in some cases, high-ability players
are more likely to commit fraud than low-ability ones. (JEL: C 7, M 4)
1 Introduction
We study a certain class of games, called doping games. A doping game is similar
to a rank-order tournament in that two or more parties are assumed to compete
for a prize. Only the winner receives a payoff. Players may come in different
types indicating their talent. It would seem natural to assume that highly talented
contestants also have a higher probability to win. In a doping game, however, players
can enhance their performance with a costly activity, which we will call doping.1
Interpreting “doping” literally, the description of such games ﬁts the use of per-
formance-enhancing drugs in sports rather well, and we will indeed couch our
discussion of the model in these terms. But, as the title suggests, the game we
analyze is amenable to interpretations outside of sports. Think, for instance, of
a contest between two division managers who compete for being promoted to the top
management level. The contestants may have different abilities (strong and weak).
The contestant whose division performs better will be promoted. The “performance-
enhancing drug” may be fraudulent representation of performance: it has a cost (the
managerwho is caught cheating will be penalized), but also enhances the probability
of promotion. As in a sporting contest, there is just one prize (one promotion) to
be distributed, so cheating exerts a negative externality on competitors. Stretching
the analogy a bit, we may also interpret the game in terms of companies competing
∗ We thank the anonymous referees for diligent reviews.
1 The classic reference on rank-order tournaments is LAZEAR AND ROSEN [1981].
The literature that followed this seminal contribution typically does not address issues
of dynamics, which are at the center of the present paper.
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for investors. The prize that the CEO of the company receives who reports the
highest proﬁt and who can convince the public of its bright future is most likely
to keep his job and to receive a large bonus. Embellishing the ﬁnancial status of
the ﬁrm redirects capital from competing ﬁrms to the cheater, so, as before, there
is an externality. Cheating is achieved in that case with the help of an auditor. In
that sense, Enron and Worldcom may be viewed as cases of doping, and Arthur
Andersen was their amphetamine.
Having analyzed doping and fraudulent behavior as equilibrium phenomena, it
seems logical to also discuss policy measures against such behavior. In this short
paper, however, we only brieﬂy discuss measures that are available for reducing
or inhibiting doping, in section 4.2. For a fuller discussion of such issues in the
context of doping games, see BERENTSEN [2002] and BERENTSEN, BRÜGGER, AND
LÖRTSCHER [2003].
The simplest version of a doping game has two players with equal talent who
compete for a prize. Given their equal abilities, each contestant has a ﬁfty-percent
chance of winning. By taking some drug (or committing fraud), a contestant can
increase his odds of winning at the expense of his clean (or honest) competitor.
If both players dope, the odds of winning are again ﬁfty–ﬁfty, but both players
also bear the cost of doping. The game has therefore the structure of a prisoners’
dilemma. If the costs of doping are not prohibitive, doping is a dominant strategy.
In this paper, we study the replicator dynamics of doping games between dif-
ferently talented competitors. The underlying game is a so-called bimatrix game.
In contrast to games in which all players are symmetric (same set of strategies
and same payoffs), bimatrix games are used to analyze situations with different
types of agents. A typical bimatrix game is the battle of the sexes, where there is
a conﬂict concerning parental investment between males and females (HOFBAUER
AND SIGMUND [1998, pp. 113ff.]); another is the two-population matching game
(WEIBULL [1995, pp. 176ff.]). For the most part, we restrict attention to games
between just two types of players (weak and strong), but we also discuss an ex-
ample of contests among three types of players. Interestingly, for some parameters
the replicator dynamics is characterized by cycles similar to the cycles observed in
matching-pennies games. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport, and
cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting.
2 The Model
We consider sports contests where athletes can use performance-enhancing drugs
to improve their game. The population of athletes is of two types: weak and strong.
The fraction of strong players is q and assumed to be constant over time, that
is, we do not consider the evolutionary dynamics of strong and weak players;
rather, we are interested in how the use of performance-enhancing drugs within the
strong and within the weak population evolves over time. We assume two large but
ﬁnite populations of individuals, one such population for the weak and one for the
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strong. The players are randomly drawn from the two populations and matched in
pairs.2 Accordingly, there are three possible match types: two strong players are
matched (ss), two weak players are matched (ww), and a strong player is matched
with a weak player (sw).
The players have Von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences about winning and
losing the competition. The winning player receives utility U, and the losing player
receives zero utility. For simplicity, we assume that if no drugs are taken, a strong
player when matched with a weak player wins the game with certainty, and when
matched with another strong player he wins with probability 1/2. Also, a weak
player when matched with another weak player wins the game with probability 1/2.
When a doped player is matched with a clean player, regardless whether this player
is weak or strong, he wins the game with certainty. When two doped players are
matched, the winning probabilities are the same as when two clean players are
matched.3
Doping improves the performance of the players at cost k, where 0 < k < U . The
cost k reﬂects the fact that athletes do not like to cheat: Each athlete prefers winning
without using performance-enhancing drugs over winning with their use. However,
each athlete also prefers winning with performance-enhancing drugs over losing
without them, i.e., U > U − k > 0. The cost may also represent the expected health
cost and the monetary cost of drugs. In the following we normalize U = 1.4
We assume that each individual is, at each instant of time, programmed to one
of the pure strategies, that is, either to take performance-enhancing drugs or to stay
clean. Let ps (pw) be the fraction of strong (weak) players that dope. Denote by Ass
the payoff matrix for a strong player who is matched with another strong player,
by Asw the payoff matrix for a strong player who is matched with a weak player,
by Aws the payoff matrix for a weak player who is matched with a strong player,
and by Aww the payoff matrix of a weak player who is matched with another weak
player. These payoff matrices are
Ass = Aww =
[ 1
2 − k 1 − k
0 12
]
,
Asw =
[
1 − k 1 − k
0 1
]
, Aws =
[−k 1 − k
0 0
]
.
2 The analysis in a two-player framework is appropriate for many sports (boxing,
tennis, martial arts, etc.). It also applies to team sports, such as soccer or football,
where the team manager decides whether her team will use performance-enhancing
drugs. It may also apply to other sports, such as cycling or downhill skiing, when two
clear leaders compete for the ﬁrst prize and the other competitors have no inﬂuence on
this decision.
3 These assumptions about how doping affects the winning probabilities are gener-
alized in section 4. They have no bearing on the qualitative features of the equilibria.
4 That is to say, the cost of doping, k, is measured in units of the utility the winner
receives. None of the properties of the equilibrium are affected by this normalization.
The comparative study of equilibrium dynamics with respect to k is thus equivalent to
studying a reciprocal change of U while keeping k constant.
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Consider for example the matrix Ass . The ﬁrst entry in the ﬁrst row is the expected
payoff of a strong player who is matched with another strong player when both
players dope: he bears the doping cost k, and with probability 1/2 he wins the game.
The second entry in the ﬁrst row represents the payoff when the strong player’s
partner is clean: in this case the player again bears the doping cost k, and he wins
the game with certainty. The ﬁrst entry in the second row is the expected payoff of
a strong player who is clean when matched with a strong player who dopes. The
payoff is zero because a clean player loses the game with certainty. The second
entry in the second row is the expected payoff of a strong player who is clean and
matched with another strong and clean player. The payoff is 1/2, because the two
players are equally likely to win the game. The other payoff matrices have a similar
interpretation.
To proceed, denote by usd (uwd) the average payoff of strong (weak) players
that dope, and by usc (uwc) the average payoff of strong players that stay clean. The
average payoffs of strong and of weak players are denoted by us and uw, respectively.
These average payoffs are calculated as follows:
usd = q (1, 0) Ass (ps, 1 − ps)T + (1 − q) (1, 0) Asw (pw, 1 − pw)T ,
usc = q (0, 1) Ass (ps, 1 − ps)T + (1 − q) (0, 1) Asw (pw, 1 − pw)T ,
us = psusd + (1 − ps)usc,
uwd = q (1, 0) Aws (ps, 1 − ps)T + (1 − q) (1, 0) Aww (pw, 1 − pw)T ,
uwc = q (0, 1) Aws (ps, 1 − ps)T + (1 − q) (0, 1) Aww (pw, 1 − pw)T ,
uw = pwuwd + (1 − pw)uwc.
(1)
For example, consider the average payoff of a strong player who dopes, usd .
This player is matched with another strong player with probability q, and with
a weak player with probability 1 − q. In the former case the expected payoff is
(1, 0) Ass (ps, 1 − ps)T because the other strong player is a doper with probabil-
ity ps. In the later case the expected payoff is (1, 0) Asw (pw, 1 − pw)T , because the
weak partner dopes with probability pw.
The standard replicator dynamics is given by
p˙s = ps (usd − us) = 12 (1 − ps) ps [−2k + q + 2 (1 − q) pw] ,
p˙w = pw (uwd − uw) = 12 (1 − pw) pw (1 − 2k + q − 2qps) .
(2)
The idea behind (2) is that the fraction of doped agents of each type increases if
doping yields a larger average payoff than staying clean (if uid is larger than uic,
which is equivalent to uid > ui for i = s, w); the fraction decreases if staying clean
is more proﬁtable. This replicator dynamics goes back to a paper by TAYLOR AND
JONKER [1978]. It is today widely used in evolutionary game theory to describe the
dynamics of the composition of strategies in a population.5 The basic idea is that
the share of a strategy that is more successful on average increases over time.
5 Other dynamics have also been investigated. A general approach is put forth by
KANDORI, MAILATH, AND ROB [1993].
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In the following we want to characterize the stationary states. For this purpose
denote the state space byP = [0,1]2. Any point p := (ps, pw) ∈P represents a dis-
tribution of individuals in the two populations i ∈ {s,w}, across the pure strategies d
and c available to the agents. Inspection of (2) reveals that the strategy proﬁles (1,1),
(1,0), (0,1), and (0,0) are stationary states for all (k,q).6 In addition, for some (k,q)
there are also stationary states in the interior ofP. Deﬁne the set
♦ := {(k, q) | min{2 − 2k, 2k} > q > max{1 − 2k, 2k − 1}}.(3)
If (k, q) ∈ ♦, the point
( pˆs, pˆw) :=
(
1 − 2k + q
2q
,
2k − q
2(1 − q)
)
(4)
is stationary.
We nowcharacterize the stability properties of the stationary states. Propositions 1
and 2 concern different areas of the parameter space that give rise to different stability
properties of the equilibria. It is helpful to deﬁne the following sets (see Figure 1,
where we have labeled them accordingly):
DD := {(k, q) | 1 − 2k > q > 2k},
dD := {(k, q) | q < min{1 − 2k, 2k}},
Dc := {(k, q) | q > max{1 − 2k, 2k}},
CC := {(k, q) | 2k − 1 > q > 2(1 − k)},
cC := {(k, q) | q < min{2k − 1, 2(1 − k)}},
Cd := {(k, q) | q > max{2k − 1, 2(1 − k)}}.
The letters refer to the equilibrium pure strategies of the strong and the weak players,
respectively. Capital letters indicate that the respective strategy is dominant in this
particular region. Lowercase letters indicate that the strategy is only a best reply.
Deﬁne further
Pdd = P \ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)} , Pcc = P \ {(0,1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} ,
Pcd = P \ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)} , Pdc = P \ {(0,0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} .
PROPOSITION 1 (i) If (k, q) ∈ DD ∪ dD, any initial state p ∈ Pdd converges to
state (1, 1). (ii) If (k, q) ∈ CC ∪ cC, any initial state p ∈ Pcc converges to state
(0, 0). (iii) If (k, q) ∈ Dc, any initial state p ∈ Pdc converges to state (1, 0). (iv) If
(k, q) ∈ Cd, any initial state p ∈ Pcd converges to state (0, 1).
PROOF We only prove statement (i), because the proofs of statements (ii) to (iv)
are analogous.
6 If q = 1− 2k, then all points in {(1, z) | z ∈ [0,1]} are also stationary states. Along
the same lines, the states in {(0, z) | z ∈ [0,1]} are stationary if q = 2k − 1, the states in
{(z,1) | z ∈ [0,1]} are stationary if q = 2(1− k), and the states in {(0, z) | z ∈ [0,1]} are
stationary if q = 2k. Throughout the paper we ignore these special cases.
D
el
iv
er
ed
 b
y 
In
ge
nt
a
? 
13
1.
15
2.
21
1.
59
 F
ri,
 0
2 
M
ar
 2
01
8 
11
:0
4:
29
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 M
oh
r S
ie
be
ck
Fraudulent Accounting(2004) 407
Figure 1
Stable Points
Case 1: (k, q) ∈ DD = {(k,q) | 1 − 2k > q > 2k}. From (2) we get
p˙s = 12 (1 − ps) ps [−2k + q + 2 (1 − q) pw] > (1 − ps) ps (1 − q) pw > 0,
p˙w = 12 (1 − pw) pw (1 − 2k + q − 2qps) > (1 − pw) pwq (1 − ps) > 0.
If (k, q) ∈ DD, doping is a dominant strategy for both player types, so that any initial
state p ∈ Pdd converges to (1, 1).
Case 2: (k, q) ∈ dD = {(k, q) | q < min{1 − 2k, 2k}}. From (2) we get
p˙s = 12 (1 − ps) ps [−2k + q + 2 (1 − q) pw] > 0 if pw >
2k − q
2 (1 − q) > 0,
p˙w = 12 (1 − pw) pw (1 − 2k + q − 2qps) > (1 − pw) pwq (1 − ps) > 0.
In this case the weak players have a dominant strategy to dope, so that eventually
all weak players dope. The strong players have no dominant strategy. However,
for pw sufﬁciently large we have p˙s > 0. Thus, if (k,q) ∈ dD, any p ∈Pdd converges
to (1,1). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 establishes that the stationary point (1, 1) is almost globally stable if
(k, q) ∈ DD ∪ dD. The “almost” refers to the fact that the unstable stationary states
(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0) are not in the basin of attraction of (1, 1). Analogous statements
apply to the stationary points in the other regions deﬁned above. They, too, are either
almost globally stable or unstable.
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PROPOSITION 2 Assume (k, q) ∈ ♦. The interior stationary state pˆ is Lyapunov-
stable, but not asymptotically stable. Moreover, for each p ∈ intP, there is a cyclical
orbit O ⊂ intP that is a Lyapunov-stable set.
PROOF We ﬁrst show that pˆ is a Lyapunov-stable point. It sufﬁces to show that the
system (2) has an associated Lyapunov function for pˆ [deﬁned in (4)] with zero time
derivative.
Consider the following function:
L (p) := L( pˆ) − L(p),(5)
with L(p) := (1 − 2k + q) ln(ps) + (−1 + 2k + q) ln(1 − ps)
+(2 − 2k − q) ln(1 − pw) + (2k − q) ln(pw).
Step 1: L attains a global minimum at pˆ. By deﬁnition, L ( pˆ) = 0. We need to
show that L (p) > 0 for all p = pˆ. To establish this, note that the Hessian of L ,

1 − 2k + q
p2s
+ −1 + 2k + q
(1 − ps)2 0
0
2 − 2k − q
(1 − pw)2 +
2k − q
p2w

 ,
is positive deﬁnite everywhere if (k, q) ∈ ♦. Moreover, the gradient of L vanishes
at pˆ. Thus, L attains a global minimum at pˆ.
Step 2: L˙ = 0 along a solution path. We have
L˙ (p) = ∂L
∂ps
p˙s + ∂L
∂pw
p˙w,
where p˙s and p˙w are deﬁned in (2). We want to show that L˙ (p) = 0 for all p ∈ intP
if (k, q) ∈ ♦. To do so note that
∂L
∂ps
p˙s = − 12 (1 − 2k + q)(1 − ps)[−2k + q + 2(1 − q)pw]
+ 1
2
(−1 + 2k + q)ps[−2k + q + 2(1 − q)pw],
∂L
∂pw
p˙w = 12 (2 − 2k − q)pw(1 − 2k + q − 2qps)
− (2k − q)1
2
(1 − pw)(1 − 2k + q − 2qps).
Simplifying yields
∂L
∂ps
p˙s = −12 (1 − 2k + q − 2qps) [−2k + q + 2 (1 − q) pw] = −
∂L
∂pw
p˙w.
Evidently, ∂L /∂ps p˙s + ∂L /∂pw p˙w = 0, establishing the claim.
Steps 1 and 2 establish thatL is a Lyapunov function for pˆ, hence pˆ is a Lyapunov-
stable point. We now show that there are Lyapunov-stable orbits around pˆ.
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Step 3: For each p¯ ∈ intP there exists a cyclical orbitO ⊂ intP that is a Lyapunov-
stable set (WEIBULL [1995, p. 244]). Let O be the solution orbit associated with
some ﬁxed ( p¯s, p¯w) := p¯ ∈ intP. Let p˜ := ( p˜s, p˜w). Formally,
O :=
{
p˜
∣∣∣ ∃T p˜ = p¯ +
∫ T
0
p˙ dt
}
,
where p˙ is given by (2).O is the collection of all p˜ that the system reaches sometime
in the future if we start out from p¯. By step 2 we have L˙ (p) = 0 along any such
solution orbit. It therefore follows thatL (p) =: λO is constant for all p ∈ O. Deﬁne
now a Lyapunov function for this orbit as follows:
LO(p) := (L (p) − λO)2 .
Clearly, LO(p) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if p ∈ O. Moreover, L˙O(p) = 0;
hence O is a Lyapunov-stable set, but not an asymptotically stable set. Q.E.D.
The stable cyclical orbits of Proposition 2 are reminiscent of the evolutionary
dynamics of the matching-pennies game. This is no coincidence, because in essence
the doping game has the same structure. The strong player wants to dope only if the
weak player does. For the weak player, however, doping is only interesting if the
strong player stays clean. The point pˆ, which is stationary if (k,q) ∈ ♦, is equivalent
to the mixed Nash equilibrium of the standard matching-pennies game.
The comparative statics of the stationary points are somewhat surprising. Inter-
estingly, the strong and weak players react differently to a change in the cost of
doping. Given q, the fraction of strong players that use doping decreases mono-
tonically as the cost of doping k increases. The same is not true for the population
of weak players. If q > 1/2, all weak players use doping at the stationary point if
k < (1 − q)/2. On increasing the cost of doping marginally above this threshold, the
fraction of weak players using doping in the stationary equilibrium discontinuously
drops to zero, as long as (1 − q)/2 < k < q/2. On increasing k further we enter the
♦-region. In this region, the fraction of weak players using doping in the interior
stationary state pˆ increases with the cost of doping. The reason for this counterintu-
itive comparative statics is that the decrease in the fraction of strong players that use
doping makes doping more attractive for weak players. This effect is stronger than
the direct cost effect, so that, in sum, the fraction of weak players that use doping
increases with the cost of doping in this region.
Note also that if (k,q) ∈ ♦ and k < 1/2, then ps exceeds pw in the interior strategy
stationary point. Thus, it is possible that strong players are more likely to use per-
formance-enhancing drugs than weak players.
3 Interpretation
Propositions 1 and 2 are most easy to understand in connection with Figure 1.
Proposition 1 establishes that if the doping cost k and the fraction of strong players q
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are in region DD or dD, then all agents dope eventually. The intuitive reason for this
result is quite clear for region DD. In this region, the cost of doping k is sufﬁciently
small so that both types of agents have a dominant strategy to dope. This means
that, no matter what the opponent does, doping generates a larger average payoff
than staying clean. Clearly, in such a situation, the replicator dynamics causes the
doping frequency to increase monotonically over time, until eventually all players
dope.
The argument is a little bit more involved for region dD. In this region, the fraction
of weak players is large. Therefore, any player is most likely to be matched with
a weak player. Since doping costs are relatively small, weak players have a dominant
strategy to dope. Consequently, the replicator dynamics causes weak types to dope
with ever higher frequency, until eventually all of them dope. In contrast, the strong
players do not have a dominant strategy in this region. For them, doping is optimal
only if sufﬁciently many weak players dope. But since the evolutionary dynamics
leads weak types to dope no matter what, strong players will follow and eventually
all of them dope as well.
The logic of region Dc, which features a large fraction of strong players, is as
follows: here, only the strong players have a dominant strategy to dope, because
players aremost likely to be matched with strong players. Consequently, the replica-
tor dynamics leads strong types to dope with ever higher frequency, until eventually
all of them dope. In contrast, for weak players doping is proﬁtable only if strong
types stay clean, because weak players cannot win against doped strong players,
even if they use doping. Since the probability of being matched with a strong player
is high, doping does not pay on average for weak players if strong players dope with
sufﬁciently high probability. As a result, the evolutionary dynamics drives all weak
players to stay clean eventually. The intuitive reasons for regions CC, cC, and Cd
are analogous.
Proposition 2 describes the equilibria if the parameters are in region ♦. The
key concept here is Lyapunov stability: “Intuitively, a state p ∈ P is Lyapunov
stable if no small change in the population composition can lead it away, and
p ∈ P is asymptotically stable if moreover any sufﬁciently small such change
results in a movement back toward p” (WEIBULL [1995, p. 75], notation adapted).
Lyapunov stability is weaker than asymptotic stability, because it does not require
convergence. An extension of this deﬁnition is the concept of a Lyapunov-stable
set: consider a closed setO ⊂P. Suppose the dynamics is such that the equilibrium
stays within O if we start from p ∈ O. We call such a setO a solution orbit. Suppose
further that a small move from p to p′ leads to a solution orbit O ′ that is close to O.
If this is the case, we say that O is a Lyapunov-stable set (WEIBULL [1995, p. 244]).
Intuitively, a Lyapunov-stable set is an equilibrium with cycles that is not changed
a lot by small shocks.
Proposition 2 establishes that the points pˆ as deﬁned in (4) are Lyapunov-stable
points if the parameters of the game are in the region ♦. Moreover, in this region
there are also Lyapunov-stable sets that result in cyclical equilibria, as depicted in
Figure 2. From (2) and (4) we can determine that in equilibrium the state cycles
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Figure 2
Orbits for Different Costs (left) and Different Initial States (right)
in these orbits in a clockwise direction. This induces cyclical ups and downs of pw
and ps, but with a phase shift.
4 Generalizations
In this section we consider three generalizations. First we consider the case of less
than perfectly effective drugs. Then we address the effects of possible detection and
punishment of doped players. Finally, we extend the analysis to populations with
three different ability levels.
4.1 Less Effective Drugs
So far we have assumed that an athlete that takes performance-enhancing drugs wins
the game with certainty if his competitor is clean. We now consider less effective
drugs, and we also assume that a strong player matched with a weak player wins the
game with probability σ , where 1 ≥ σ ≥ 0.5. Denote by δ ≥ 0.5 the probability that
a doped strong (weak) player wins when matched with a clean strong (weak) player.
The difference δ − 0.5 speciﬁes the effectiveness of performance-enhancing drugs
in the sense of measuring the increase of a player’s winning probability when only
that player dopes. Denote further by δsw (δws) the probability that a doped strong
(weak) player wins when matched with a clean weak (strong) player, where δsw ≥ σ
(δws ≥ 1 − σ). Note that in the previous section we have assumed σ = δ = δsw =
δws = 1, i.e., we have assumed maximal effectiveness of performance-enhancing
drugs. In this section we argue that nothing changes qualitatively if we assume that
performance-enhancing drugs are less than completely effective.
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With these new speciﬁcations of the winning probabilities the standard replicator
dynamics is
p˙s =12 (1 − ps)ps[−2k + (2δ − 1)q
+ 2(1 − q)(δsw − σ) − 2(1 − q)(1 + δsw − δws − 2σ)pw],
p˙w =12 (1 − pw)pw[−2k + (2δ − 1)(1 − q)
+ 2q(δws + σ − 1) + 2q(1 + δsw − δws − 2σ)ps].
(6)
Inspection of (6) reveals that this dynamics has the same qualitative properties as
in the previous section. In particular the proﬁles (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0) are
stationary states for all (k,q) ∈P. Also, for some (k,q) there are interior distributions
( ˆˆps, ˆˆpw) that are stationary:
ˆˆps =
2k − (2δ − 1)(1 − q) − 2q(δws + σ − 1)
2q(1 + δsw − δws − 2σ) ,
ˆˆpw =
−2k + (2δ − 1)q + 2(1 − q)(δsw − σ)
2(1 − q)(1 + δsw − δws − 2σ) .
Note that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold because (6) has the same quali-
tative properties as (2). That is to say, all combinations of noninterior strategies are
stationary points, but, depending on (k, q), at most one of them is asymptotically
stable. For some (k, q), there is an interior stationary point that is Lyapunov-stable,
but not asymptotically stable. In that case, there are also Lyapunov-stable cyclical
orbits hovering around the stationary point.
4.2 Detection and Punishments
We have not addressed the possibility of detection and punishments so far. We
add this possibility now as follows. Suppose tests are performed after the contest
with probability τ . The test detects a doped player with probability β, so 1 − β is
the probability of false negatives. The test may also produce false positives, that is,
erroneously identify clean players as doped, with probability α. A perfect test would
have α = 0 and β = 1. The test is at least to some extent informative if β > α, and this
is what we assume. An agent who is identiﬁed as doped is subject to a punishment π.
Let u˜sd denote the average payoff of strong doped players, and likewise for u˜sc, u˜wd ,
u˜wc. The expected punishment of doped players is given by the probability that a test
is performed τ times the probability of being detected β times the punishment π, so
u˜sd = usd − τβπ and u˜wd = uwd − τβπ. For clean players, the expected punishment is
ταπ, so u˜sc = usc − ταπ and u˜wc = uwc − ταπ, where uij are given by (1). As before,
u˜s := psu˜sd + (1 − ps)u˜sc and u˜w := pwu˜wd + (1 − pw)u˜wc denote average payoffs of
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strong and weak players, respectively. The replicator dynamics is now
p˙s = ps (u˜sd − u˜s)
= 1
2
(1 − ps) ps {−2[k + τ(β − α)π] + q + 2 (1 − q) pw} ,
p˙w = pw (u˜wd − u˜w)
= 1
2
(1 − pw) pw {1 − 2[k + τ(β − α)π] + q − 2qps} .
(7)
Comparing this with (2) reveals that tests and punishments have precisely the
same effect on the dynamics as increasing the cost k by τ(β − α)π. This implies
in particular that increasing the punishment π or the testing probability τ or the
accuracy of the test (β − α) may actually lead to more doping in some cases.
We have introduced testing and punishments in a particularly simple fashion here.
A possible variation is to assume that the losing party inherits the prize if the losing
party passes the doping test but the winning party does not. The dynamics of this
case (a static version of this situation is the subject of BERENTSEN [2002]) would
be quantitatively different from our model, but the main qualitative features would
probably remain: there are equilibria in which the high-ability players are more
likely to cheat, and there can be Lyapunov-stable cycles.
4.3 Three Population Games
So far we have restricted attention to games with only two types of players. But
the logic of doping games is not restricted to this case, and the analysis can be
extended to a richer selection of types. A doping game with three types of players,
for instance, would feature a highly talented population, an intermediately talented
population, and a weakly talented population, with given population shares q1, q2,
and q3 := 1 − q1 − q2. Two randomly chosen players from the whole population play
the contest. The winning probabilities are inﬂuenced by the talent of the players and
by whether they use doping or not.
Such a game has many parameters: the population shares, the cost of doping, and
the winning probabilities of the different types of agents in all possible matches.
Essentially, nothing changes with respect to the two-population doping game. For
some parameters we ﬁnd almost globally stable strategies: stationary points on the
boundary of the strategy space. For some parameters, there are stationary points that
are interior for two player types (meaning that a portion of players of this type stay
clean while others dope), but the players that belong to the third type all do the same
(all dope or all stay clean). And for some parameters, there are stationary points
where all three player types end up in the interior of the strategy space, indicating
that for each type, some dope and some do not.
Moreover, one can also generate Lyapunov-stable cyclical orbits around such
interior stationary points. As an illustration, Figure 3 depicts such an orbit. This
example assumes equal population shares q1 = q2 = q3 = 1/3, and cost of doping
k = 1/3. Doping has the effect of allowing a weak player to win for sure against
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Figure 3
Cycles in Three-Population Doping Games
a clean mid-talent type, but not against a clean high type. A doped mid-talent type
wins with certainty against a clean high type. In this example, most of the time
almost all highly talented players use doping, while weakly talented players almost
never use doping. The fraction of mid-talented players that dope is initially large
but decreases as long as the fraction of strong players that use doping is large. When
the fraction of mid-talented doped players has decreased enough, the beneﬁt of
doping for weak players increases, because with doping they have a chance to win if
they meet a clean mid-talented person. Thus, the weak players begin to use doping.
For the highly talented people, the beneﬁt of doping becomes smaller, however,
because so few mid-talented people use doping. Hence, the share of high types that
use doping reduces rapidly. This, however, incites mid-talented players to resume
doping, and we are back to square one.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed an evolutionary game between two athlete types
who can use performance-enhancing drugs at a cost. We ﬁnd that, depending on
parameter values, different asymptotically stable strategy equilibria exist on the
boundary of the strategy space, or if not, then an interior strategy equilibrium exists,
which is only weakly (Lyapunov, but not asymptotically) stable. In that case, there
are also cyclical orbits, where doping and staying clean alternate. The reason for this
behavior is that the two-population game has a structure similar to the matching-
pennies game, unlike the one-population doping game, which has the structure of
the prisoners’ dilemma.
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Although we couch the discussion of the model in terms of sports, the model
does have applications outside of sports. The strategic incentives of a manager or
ﬁrm to misreport proﬁt is one example. With this interpretation, our model suggests
that with some parameter combinations, high-ability managers may be more likely
to cheat. Also, we may observe waves of cheating and honesty.
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